El Límite del Diseño Institucional en Ecuador

Abstract

Recent studies in political science and in the new institutional economics confer the political system a central relevance within the discussion regarding economic development. In this view, institutional design emerges as one of the main and most effective development policies. After introducing the theoretical framework, the document discusses the elements that limit the efficacy of institutional design: informal institutions, complexity of the social system, transaction cost politics and institutional capture. From a methodological perspective, the document shows the current limits of game theory and econometrics as tools for the definition of concrete institutional designs. Nevertheless, 1t emphasizes that development-related studies should combine discursive visions with quantitative tools, in line with the approach advanced by the analytic narratives. The document argues that the failure of institutional reforms in Ecuador is due to the fact that institutional design has focused exclusively on the formal elements of the political system, without taking into consideration other relevant elements of the social structure.